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FOREWORD

Today,thereis a growingrecognitionthatat particularstagesof financialsector
developmentthe conversionof the traditionalmanually-processed
paymentsysteminto an
throughimproved
electronicfund transfersystemsupportssoundfinancialmarketdevelopment
certaintyandtimelinessof payments.Whena partytransforms,
throughelectronicmeans,its
claim againsta bank into anotherparty'sclaim againsta bank,the productof wire transfer
processing
is a distinctlylegalconcept. Thus,oneof the commontasksof the World Bankin
helpingdevelopwiretransfersystems
in clientcountriesisto providetechnicaladviceon setting
up the legalframeworkgoverningpaymenttransactions.
The paperby ProfessorRaj Bhalais preparedto servethis purpose. It was
originally presentedat the World BankSeminaron "PaymentSystemsin FinancialSector
Development"in April 1995. Thisseminarwasinitiatedby the FinancialSectorDevelopment
Departmentof the World Bankandorganizedin conjunctionwith the FederalReserveBankof
to this paper,andthe ensuingdebateit provoked,we
Richmond.Giventhe positiveresponse
decidedto publishthis paperto a wider audience.
We are surethis paperwill proveto be of greatinterestto thosewho specialize
in paymentsystemsissues,aswell as thosewith a broaderinterestin financialmattersduring
transitionand development.
Gary L. Perlin
Director
FinancialSectorDevelopmentDepartment
FinancialandPrivateSectorDevelopment
TheWorld Bank

I

ABSTRACT

This paperexaminesthe legalfoundationsof large-valuecredittransfersystems
and the importanceof certainty,efficiency,andfairnessin fundstransferlaw. A casestudyis
five particularlynoteworthy
presented
to highlightkey terminologyand concepts.Thereafter,
legalrulesare discussed
in the contextof the casestudy: (1)a rule definingthe scopeof the
law; (2) a rule establishing
when the rightsand obligationsof partiesto a fundstransferare
triggered;(3) a receiverfinality rule; (4)a rule assigningliability for interloperfraud;and (5)a
money-back
guarantee
rule, coupledwith provisionson discharge.Finally,strategicconcerns
affectingthe draftingof a fundstransferlaw are identified.
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INTRODUCTION
This paperexplainsthe interactionsamongthe main pillars of law which
shouldgovernlarge-value
credittransfersystems.It doesso by focusingon the essenceof
the Americanlegalregimegoverninglarge-value
credittransfersystems.Thesameessential
principlesdiscussed
hereinarefoundin the new internationallegalregimegoverningthese
systems. Accordingly,the paperwill be usefulto readerswho are concernedwith the
developmentof fundstransferlawsin othercountries.
Thepaperconsistsof four remainingparts. In Part1,the relationshipbetween
the legalframeworkfor a large-value
credittransfersystemandthe developmentof an ideal
systemis discussed.Part 11brieflysurveysthe five foundationsof a legalframeworkfor
large-valuecredittransfersystems.PartIll introducesa casestudyof a fundstransferand
employsessentiallegal terminology. In Part IV, the five foundationsof a legal regime
governingfundstransferlaw are discussedin detail usingthe essentiallegalterminology.
PartV considersgeneralprinciplesof draftinga fundstransferlaw in the specialcontextof
developingandtransitioneconomies.The countriesof the formerSovietUnionand Baltic
regionareconsidered
asexamples.Finally,concludingobservations
aresetforth in PartVI.
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1. THE IMPORTANCEOF THE GOVERNING LEGALREGIME
(but not sufficient)conditionfor a thoroughdiscussionof largeA necessary
arepopular
is a treatmentof U.C.C.Article4A. Whetherthesetransfers
valuecredittransfers
andwhetherthey areconducted
meansof paymentfrom the view of individualtransactors,
are issuesthat necessarily
in a safeand soundmannerfrom the view of banksupervisors,
involvethe law. Fundstransferlaw shouldservethe interestsof thecommercialpartieswho
to settletheir paymentobligationsandin particular
credittransfersystems
look to large-value
below, illtransactions.As discussed
and
international
domestic
growth
in
facilitate
should
conceivedfundstransferrules,or a legalvoid, can retardthe growthand developmentof
which generate
large-valuecredit transfersystems. In turn, the underlyingtransactions
paymentsobligationsmaybe hampered.
are of enormousimportance.For example,over
credittransfers
Large-value
in the UnitedStatesaresentoverlarge-dollarelectronic
80 percentof the dollarstransferred
fundstransfernetworks.Everydayin the UnitedStates,roughlytwo trillion U.S.dollarsare
System(CHIPS).
by meansof FedwireandtheClearingHouseInterbankPayments
transferred
Dependingon the structureof the laws governingfunds transfers,potential usersand
providersof fundstransferservicesmay find theseserviceseithermoreor lessattractive.
"by wire" eachday, and with the average
With so muchmoneytransferred
valueof eachtransfersohigh,thepotentialfor largelossesisgreat.Thus,commercialparties
and sensiblelegal
makingand receivingsuch paymentsrequirea clear,comprehensible,
regimeto answertwo basicquestions.First,how shoulda fundstransfernormallywork?
Second,what happensif a mishapoccurs?Thereis a third public policy issueof particular
concernto centralbankers,namely,systemicrisk - how can this risk be minimizedand
contained?
Oneway to approachtheseissuesis to considerthe theoreticalunderpinnings
of an ideal paymentssystem.Arguably,an ideal paymentssystemmusthavethreesalient
features: it must be certain(i.e., reliable),efficient(i.e., high speed,low cost, and high
1' Thatis, largeamounts
of liability).
security),and fair (i.e., equitablein its apportionment
of fundsmustbetransmittedat low costandwith highsecurity,andthe rightsandobligations
of partiesto the fundstransfermustbe allocatedin a fair manner.A legalframeworkfor a
credittransfersystemis essentialto ensuringthatall threefeaturesarepresentin
large-value
the system.
±'

See generally Raj Bhala, Paying for the Deal: An Analysis of Wire Transfer Law and International Financial
Market Interest Groups, 42 KANSASLAWREVIEw667 (spring 1994) and ERNESTT. PATRIKIS,THOMASC. BAXTER,JR.,
23-5 (1993).
AND RAJBHALA,WIRE TRANSFERS

- 3 First, burdensomeor unclear legal rules raise the costs of a funds transfer,
therebyreducingefficiency. In turn, the systembecomeslessattractiveto potential providers
of systemservices,usersof those services,or both. For example,supposean automobile
company instructsits bank to make a $5 million paymentto a steel supplier. The payment
is made through the Bank of Credit and CommerceInternational (BCCI),but before the
payment transaction is complete BCCI fails. Does the automobile company, the steel
company,the creditors of BCCI,or some other party bear the $5 million loss? If the legal
frameworkfails to provide an unequivocalanswer,then uncertaintyis generated. In reaction
to uncertainty,systemprovidersand usersmusttakeprecautions- that is, insureagainstrisks
- hence,the cost of providing and using the systeminevitably will increase.
Second, the lack of rules on authenticity and security reduces reliability.
Consequently,the systemcreatesuncertaintiesand risk for both its providersand users. For
example,supposea U.S. bank that receivesa $500,000 paymentinstruction from one of its
customersdiscovers- after the payment is made to an offshorebank - that the instruction
is unauthorized. What are the rightsand obligationsof the U.S. bank, its customer,and the
offshorebank? If the legal frameworkdoesnot provide a clear answer,then the systemwill
be viewed as unreliable by prospectiveusersand providersof systemservices.
Third, an over-allocationof duties to systemprovidersor to systemuserscan
be unfair. In addition, it may leadto a non-levelplayingfield. Forexample,where liabilities
are skewedtoward non-bankusersof a large-valuefunds transfersystem,banksmay enjoy
a monopoly position. When potential usersor providersperceivea systemto be unfair, they
simply will not use or provide, respectively,systemservices.
In sum, there is an integral link between (1) the legal foundationsof a largevalue credit transfersystemand (2) extentto which that systemis an ideal one. The essence
of the American and United Nations legal regimesgoverning large-valuecredit transfer
systemscan be grasped by understandingfive legal rules. These rules - the five legal
foundations - are designedto make the systemsto which the rules apply more efficient,
reliable, and safe. To be sure,theseare not the only rules in the U.S. or internationalfunds
transferlaws, and reasonablepeople may contendthat there are other equally or even more
essentialstatutoryprovisions. But, distilling the law to five rulesassuredlyyields much of the
essenceof the law.
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II. AN OVERVIEWOF THE FIVE LEGALFOUNDATIONS
To appreciate
the rules,it is first necessary
to masterthe terminologyof funds
transferlaw andto useapplicabletermsin the contextof a typicalfundstransfer.(Theterms
"fundstransfers"and "credit transfers"are usedinterchangeably,
as are the terms "funds
21
transfersystems"and "large-valuecredittransfersystems."
) Accordingly,the five critical
elementsin theAmericanandinternational
fundstransferlawsaresetforthin theappropriate
legalterminologyand context.
The economicandpolicyjustificationsfor the five legalrulesarebeyondthe
scopeof this presentation.)'Similarly,thereis no attemptto argueor provethat the rules
discussedhereinare the exclusivelegal pillarsof fundstransferlaw. By settingforth the
importantprovisionsin Americanfundstransferlaw,the presentation
will serveasa point of
departurefor the futurework and studyof the lawyer,banker,or scholar.4'
The five rulesare set forth in Article4A of the Uniform CommercialCode
(U.C.C.),the principallaw in the UnitedStatesgoverningfundstransfers,5
andthe United

-'

A definition of "funds transfers"is found in U.C.C. Section4A-104(a), and a "funds transfer system" is defined in
Section 4A-105(a)(5).
For theoretical discussionsof funds transfer law, see Raj Bhala, Paying for the Deal: An Analysis of Wire Transfer
Law and International Financial Market Interest Groups," 42 KANSAS
LAw REVIEW
667 (spring 1994)and The
InvertedPyramidof WireTransfer
Law,82 KENTUCKY
LAWJOURNAL
347(winter1993-94)
reprintedin JOSEPH
J.
NORTON,ETAL., EDS.,ELECTRONIC
BANKING
(1994).SeealsoFairfaxLeary,Jr.and PatriciaB. Fry,A 'Systems
Approach'to PaymentModes: Moving Towarda New PaymentsCode, 16 UNIFORMCOMMERCIAL
CODELAW

3.

JOURNAL283 (1984);and Hal S. Scott,CorporateWire Transfers
and the Uniform New PaymentsCode, 83
COLUMBIALAWREVIEW1664(1983). Fora microeconomic
analysisof lossallocationrulesin consumerpayments
transactions,
see R. Cooterand E. Rubin,A Theoryof LossAllocation for ConsumerPayments,66 TEXASLAW

REVIEW
63(1987)andHalS.Scott,THERISKFIXERS,
91 HARVARD
LAWREVIEW
737(1978).Forthisanalysis
in the
fundstransfercontext,seeJudgeRichardPosner'sopinion in EvraCorp.v. SwissBankCorp.,673 F.2d951 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied,459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
This is not to imply that Article 4A is the sole practicalalternativeor teachingmodel. Indeed,the recentlyapprovedUnitedNationsModelLawon IntemationalCreditTransfers
isavailablefor nationallegislatures
to enact
in whole or part. U.N. GAOR,47th Sess.,Supp.No. 17, at Annex 1 p. 48, U.N. Doc. A/47/17(1992). For a

4/

discussion
of theModelLaw,seeERNEST
T.PATRIKIS,
THOMAS
C. BAXTER,
JR.,ANDRAJBHALA
WIRETRANSFERS
parts
IlIland V (1993).
'

Article 4A does not govern paper-based
methodsof paymentslike negotiableinstrumentsor lettersof credit
(though,of course,paymentordersassociated
with an electronicfundstransfermaybe issuedin writing). The
versionof Article4A citedhereis the 1989Official Textwith Comments
approvedby the AmericanLawInstitute
and National Conferenceof Commissioners
on Uniform StateLaws (NCCUSL).Stateshave been quick to
incorporateArticle4A into their Uniform CommercialCodes,with over forty statesenactingthe statutein less
than threeyears. Informationon stateenactmentis providedby NCCUSL.As discussedbelow, RegulationJ,
(continued...)

-5Nations Model Law on International Credit Transfers (U.N. Model Law), the main
international legal agreementon funds transferrules.6yThey are:
(1)

a scope rule to differentiatethe parties and payment instructionsthat are
included in the law from those that are not included;

(2)

a trigger event to indicate the moment when the rights and obligations of a
party to a funds transferare manifest;

(3)

a receiverfinality rule to establishwhen credit to an account is irrevocable;

(4)

a money-back guaranteeto cover situations where a funds transfer is not
completed, coupled with a discharge rule for caseswhere the transfer is
completed;and,

(5)

an anti-fraudrule to allocate liability for fraudulent paymentsinstructions.

N(...continued)
which govemsFedwire,essentiallyincorporates
this versionof Article4A by reference,with somemodifications
and additions.
RegulationJ is codified at 12 C.F.R.Part210 subpartB (1992). Similarly,the New York ClearingHousehas
selectedNew York's versionof Article 4A as the law applicableto CHIPS. In addition,relevantadditional
provisionsare set forth in FederalReserveBankoperatingcircularsand the CHIPSrules. For a discussionof
RegulationJ and OperatingCircular No. 8, and of the CHIPSrules,seeERNESTT. PATRIKIS,THOMAS C. BAXTER,
JR.,AND RAJBHALA,WIRETRANSFERS
part III (1993).
k'

Like Article 4A, the Model Law govemselectronictransfersand not paper-based
methodsof paymentlike
areto U.C.C.Article4A and certainanalogous
negotiableinstrumentsor lettersof credit. Hereinafter,references
provisionsin the Model Law.
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111.A CASESTUDY
A discussionof the five key rules of U.C.C. Article 4A is aided by reference
to a casestudy of a funds transfer. Considerthe following hypothetical:Z
(1)

An automobilemanufacturerbuys steelworth $100,000from a steelcompany
to make vehicles. The steel company delivers the steel to the automobile
manufacturer,and the manufacturernow seeksto pay the company for the
steel by funds transfer.

(2)

The manufacturerand steel companyhold their accountsat different banks.

(3)

The manufacturerinstructsits bank to pay $100,000 to the steel company.
The instructioncontainsthe nameand account numberof the steel company
and the nameand identifying numberof the steel company'sbank.

(4)

The automobile manufacturer'sbank complies with the instruction of its
customer by further instructinga secondbank to pay $100,000 to the steel
company. This second instruction again contains the relevant information
about the steel companyand its bank.

(5)

The second bank also complies with the instruction it received. It further
instructsthe bank at which the steelcompanyhasan accountto pay $100,000
to the steel company.

(6)

The steel company's bank complies with the third instruction and pays the
company.

This hypotheticaltransactionis representedin the following diagram. Thechronologicalsteps
in the transactionare indicated by numbersin parentheses.The defined terms of U.C.C.
Article 4A are used, highlighted, and explained in detail below.

Z'

A payments obligation to be discharged bv a funds transfer can arise from virtually any sort of underlying
contractual relationship between the buyer-payorand seller-payee. While the underlying contractual obligation
in this hypothetical involves goods, in reality financial transactionsgenerate the bulk of funds transfers. Most
large-value funds transferactivity is associatedwith securitiesand foreign exchange trading. See Raj Bhala, The
LAW JOURNAL347 (winter 1993-94) and BANK FOR
Inverted Pyramid of Wire TransferLaw, 82 KENTUCKY
INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS,
PAYMENTSYSTEMS
IN ELEVENDEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
21 5 (3rd ed. 1989).

7-

Eachof theseparties,and the actionseachundertakes,hasa specific legal label
in U.C.C. Article 4A. Applying the correct labels is the first step in the processof distilling
Article 4A to its essentialingredients. Eachpayment instruction is a "payment order" if it
meetsthe requirementsof the definition of that term. This term is critical in defining the
scopeof the law.
The automobile manufactureris the "originator" of the funds transfer,that is,
"the sender of the first payment order in a funds transfer."9' The bank at which the
automobile manufacturermaintains an account and to which the first payment order is
addressedis the "originator's bank."2' The steel company is the "beneficiary" of the
originator's payment order.L' Also, it is the beneficiaryof each payment order issuedin
the funds transferchain that implementsthe originator'sorder, i.,e the paymentorder issued
by the originator's bank and the secondbank. The "beneficiary" is simply "the personto be
paid by the beneficiary's bank."-'L The bank at which the steel company maintains its
1'
accountand to which fundsare credited is the "beneficiary'sbank.'"
This term is reserved
for "the bank identified in a paymentorder in which an account of the beneficiary is to be
credited pursuantto the order or which otherwise is to make paymentto the beneficiary if
the order does not provide for payment to an account."33' The second bank is the
"intermediary bank" in that it is "a receiving bank other than the originator's bank or the
beneficiary'sbank."'4

8/

U.C.C. Section 4A-104(c).

29

U.C.C.Section4A-104(d). There is no requirementin this definition,or elsewherein Article 4A, that the
originator have a pre-existingaccount relationshipwith the originator'sbank. There is no definition of
"originator'sbank"in the Model Law.

101

U.C.C.Section4A-103(a)(2).

L

U.C.C.Section4A-103(a)(3).

2/

U.C.C.Section4A-103(a)(3).Here too, thereis no requirementof a pre-existingaccountrelationship.Thereis
no definitionof a "beneficiary'sbank"in the Model Law.

"2' U.C.C.Section4A-103(a)(3).
4'

U.C.C. Section 4A-104(b). See U.N. Model Law Article 2(g).

-8-

Diagram: Hypotheticalexampleof a fundstransfer
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Paymentorderissuedby the originator'sbank
Payment order receivedby the intermediarybank
Paymentorder acceptedby the intermediarybank
Settlementbetweenthe originator'sbankand the
intermediarybank

Automobile+

(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

Paymentorder issuedby the intermediarybank
Paymentorder receivedby the beneficiary'sbank
Paymentorderacceptedby the beneficary'sbank
Settlementbetweenthe intermediarybankand the
benefiaary'sbank

|

bank
manufacturer's
bank
Thenoriginatr's
bank
The
originator's
bankwith
A receiving
respectto the originator's
paymentorderand
a senderwith respectto
its own crderissuedto
bank.
theintermediary

Steelcompany'sbank
bank
Thebeneficiary's

SecondBank
bank
Theintermediary

bankwith
A receiving
respectto the originator's
bank'spaymentorderand
a senderwith respectto
its own orderissuedto
bank.
the beneficiary's

bankwith
A receiving
respectto the payment
orderissuedby
the intermediarybank.
$

(2) Paymentorder issuedby
the originatorto the originator'sbank.
(3) Paymentorder received
by the originator'sbank.
(4) Paymentorder accepted
by the originator'sbank.
(5) Theoriginatorpaysthe originator'sbank
for thepaymentorder.

Automobilemanufacturer
Originator
Also a sender

(14) Payment.
Creditto the
beneficiary's
account.

(1) Underlyingcontract
calling for the beneficiary
.....
to deliversteelto the
.
originatorin consideration of $100,000.

Adjunct to (12). Obligationof the originator to pay
$100,000to the benefidary is dischargedwhen the
benefidary'sbankacceptsthe paymentorder.

$
$
$
$
$
$
S

Steelcompany
Beneficiary
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The terms "sender"and "receiving bank" are generic: a senderis "the person
giving the instructionto the receivingbank" and the receivingbank is "the bankto which the
sender'sinstructionis addressed.''-"The automobilemanufacturer(theoriginator), the bank
of the automobilemanufacturer(theoriginator'sbank),andthe secondbank (theintermediary
bank)are all senders. The originator's bank, intermediarybank, and beneficiary'sbank (the
steel company'sbank) are receivingbanks.
The "funds transfer" is the entire "seriesof transactions,beginning with the
originator's paymentorder, madefor the purposeof makingpaymentto the beneficiaryof the
order."-L' It includes the payment orders issued by the originator's bank and the
intermediary bank, because these are "intended to carry out the originator's payment
order."'2` The funds transfer"is completed by acceptanceby the beneficiary's bank of a
paymentorder for the benefit of the beneficiaryof the originator's payment order.''-'
The sale of steel by the steel companyto the automobilemanufactureris the
underlying contractbetween the beneficiaryand originatorof the fundstransfer. Under the
terms of the contract, the originator has a $100,000 paymentobligation, and the originator
9'
begins the funds transferfor the purposeof dischargingthis obligation.L
The conceptof dischargeis tricky in two senses. First,its legal importance is
not alwaysclearly understood. Thecrucial point is that until the fundstransferis completed,
which occurs when the beneficiary'sbank acceptsa paymentorder for the beneficiary,the
originator is legally liable on this obligation - it is not discharged.2W'The originator's
obligation to pay the beneficiary basedon the contractfor steel is not dischargeduntil the
beneficiary'sbank acceptsa paymentorder for the benefitof the beneficiary. Thereafter,the
originator cannot be sued by the beneficiaryfor breachof contract on the grounds of nonpayment.
Second,seeminglysynonymoususesof the terms "payment obligation" (or
"payment"), "settlement obligation" (or "settlement")and "discharge" sometimesgenerate
confusion. In the funds transfercontext, the underlying payment obligation refersto the
'5'

U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(4)-(5). See U.N. Model Law Article 2(f) (defining "receiving bank").

'6'

U.C.C.Section 4A-104(a).

7/

Id.

8

Id.

'91

U.C.C. Section 4A-406(b). See U.N. Model Law, Article 19, footnote.

20/

U.C.C. Sections 4A-104(a) and 4A-406(a)-(b).
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obligation of the originator to pay the beneficiary. Thisobligation arisesfrom the underlying
contractualobligation betweenthose two parties. When the obligation is satisfied,it is said
to be legally discharged. Eachsenderwhose paymentorder is acceptedby a receivingbank
has a payment obligation to that bank, namely, to pay for the acceptedorder. The terms
"settlement"and "settlementobligation" refer to an interbank paymentobligation that arises
from the acceptanceof a payment order. That is, they refer to the paymentobligation as
between a sending and receiving bank. However, these interpretationsare basedmore on
w
customaryand trade usagethan specificsectionsof U.C.C.Article 4A.21
Eachreceivingbank hasa decisionto makewhen it receivesa paymentorder:
should it accept or reiect the order? The receiving bank is not obligated to accept an
order.22'A receiving bank may reject an order becausethe senderdoes not have sufficient
funds in its account to pay for the order. Or, a receiving bank may reject a payment
instructionbecauseit statesconditionswith which the bank is unwilling or unableto comply.
A receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank (ie, the originator's bank and
intermediary bank) acceptsa payment order by executing the order.23' "Execution" of a
payment order means that the bank "issues a payment order intended to carry out the
payment order received by the bank."L' Thus, the originator's bank acceptsthe payment
order of the originator by issuingan order that conformswith the instructionsset forth in the
order of the originator. Similarly, the intermediarybank acceptsthe payment order of the
originator's bankby issuinga conformingorder designedto implementthe originator's bank's
order.

execution.-

21/

22/

A beneficiary's bank, however, does not accept a payment order by
Rather,the beneficiary'sbank, if it acceptsthe order, is required to pay the

ERNEST T. PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR., AND RAJ BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS72-3 (1993).

U.C.C.Section4A-209and official comment3. SeeU.N. Model Law, Articles7(2), 8(2), 9 and 10(1). The
specifyingthat the bank will
with its sender-customer
receivingbankis freeto enterinto an accountagreement
acceptall paymentordersissuedby that customer. In this instance,the bank cannotreject the order. In
addition,a receivingbank is unableto rejecta paymentordertransmittedthroughFedwire.Thisis becauseone
of the waysin which a receivingbankacceptsa paymentorder is obtainingpaymentfrom its sender. U.C.C.
Section4A-209(b)(2). With a funds transferthroughFedwire,the paymentorder and payment(i.e., the
from senderto originator. ERNESTT. PATRIKtS,THOMASC. BAXTER,
instructionand value)movesimultaneously
AND RAI BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS174

(1993).

22i/

U.C.C. Section4A-209(a).

241

U.C.C. Section4A-301(a). SeeU.N. Model Law Article2(1).

25/

U.C.C. Section 4A-301(a). The U.N. Model Law does not clarify this point.

-
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beneficiarythe amount of the order.!' Typically, it does so by crediting the account of the
beneficiarymaintainedat the beneficiary'sbank.
A receiving bank's decision to accept or reject a payment order is partly a
the
credit judgment: if the order is accepted,then the sendermust pay for the order (,
originator must pay $100,000 to the originator's bank if the bank acceptsthe originator's
order, the originator's bank must pay $100,000 to the intermediarybank if the intermediary
bank acceptsthe originator's bank's order, and so forth.)27'The credit issueariseswhere
a senderdoesnot currently havefunds in its accountwith the receivingbank sufficientto pay
for the payment order. The receiving bank may, in its discretion, grant the sender an
overdraft. But, any receiving bank, including a central bank, may charge interest to the
senderfor the amount and duration of the overdraft.2-'
If the bank entitled to paymentis a receivingbank other than the beneficiary's
bank (i.e, the originator's bank or an intermediarybank), then the obligation to pay arises
upon acceptancebut does not mature until the executiondate. That is, payment is not due
until the day on which it is properfor the receivingbank to executethe order?-9'Generally,
the execution date is the day the order is received.3L1This is referred to as "same-day
execution," which meansthat the receivingbank executesthe order on the day it is received

261

U.C.C. Section 4A-404(a). While this duty is plainly sensible, the liability for failing to perform it is unique in
the statute. Failure to pay the beneficiary the amount of an acceptedorder is the only instancewhere the statute
expressly provides for consequential damages,though the bank has a defensethat it had a "reasonable doubt"
as to the entitlement of the beneficiary to payment. With respect to other duties imposed on receiving banks,
liability for consequential damagesis precluded unless such banks expressly agree to assume this liability in
writing with their sender-customers.See U.C.C. Section4A-305. The liability rules of U.C.C. Article 4A are not
treated in this chapter. However, they are relevant not only for those involved in the development of funds
transfer law in other countries but also for those giving or seekingpractical legal advice. See Note, Cancellation
of Wire TransfersUnder Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code: Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. Revisited, 70 TEXAS
LAWREVIEW
739 (1992); ErnestT. Patrikis,Thomas C. Baxter,Jr., and Raj
Bhala, Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and the Role of Counsel, 23 UNIFORM COMMERCIALCODE
LAWJOURNAL
219 (1991); and ThomasC. Baxter,Jr. and Raj Bhala, Properand Improper Execution of Payment
Orders,

45 BUSINESS LAWYER 1447 (1990).

27/

U.C.C. Section 4A-402(b)-(c). See U.N. Model Law Article 5(6).

28/

With respectto a FederalReserveBank,see,e.g., "Modification of the PaymentsSystemRisk Reduction Program;
Daylight Overdraft Pricing," 57 Federal Register 47084 (Oct. 14, 1992) and "Modification of the Payments
System Risk Reduction Program;Measurement of Daylight Overdrafts," 57 Federal Register 47093 (Oct. 14,
1992).

29/

U.C.C. Section 4A-301(b). Receiving banksare free to establish cut-off times for the receipt of payment orders.
See U.C.C. Section 4A-106 and U.N. Model Law Article 2(k). Note that the Model Law defines "execution
period" in lieu of the concepts of "execution date" and "payment date."

30/

Id. See U.N. Model Law Article 11(1).
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from the sender. On or before that day, the sendermust pay for the order.!" Paymentby
a senderto a receivingbank for a paymentorder issuedby the former and acceptedby the
latter may be made by a numberof means. Theseinclude receipt of final settlementon the
bcoks of a central bank or through a funds transfersystem(which may involve bilateral or
multilateral netting),a credit to an accountof the receivingbank with the sender,or a debit
3 2'
to an account of the senderwith the receivingbank.
If the bank entitled to payment is the beneficiary's bank, then again the
obligation to pay arisesupon acceptanceby that bank. Here, however,the sender(in the
hypothetical, the intermediarybank) need not pay the beneficiary'sbank until the payment
date. That is the date on which the amount of the payment order accepted by the
beneficiary's bank is payable to the beneficiary.33'Typically, it is the date of receipt."'
The beneficiary'sbank can pay the beneficiaryby crediting its account.!- The beneficiary
is paid asa matterof law when it "is notified of the right to withdraw the credit" or funds "are
otherwisemadeavailableto the beneficiary,"or the bank lawfully appliesthe credit to a debt
of the beneficiary."-6/
The abovediscussionhas not expresslyhighlightedthe role of a central bank
in a funds transfer. The conventional but incomplete view is that a central bank is the
intermediary bank. To be sure, a central bank often is the intermediary between two
commercial banks(the originator'sand beneficiary'sbank),the upstreamoriginator, and the
downstream beneficiary. However, a central bank can play any role in a funds transfer:
originator, originator's bank, intermediarybank,beneficiary'sbank, or beneficiary. Thus,the
critical point is that a central bank can be a senderor receivingbank at any point in a funds
transferchain.
Insertionof the central bank at any point in the funds transferwould not alter
the casestudy as a legal matterunlessfunds transferrules set forth in U.C.C. Article 4A (or

311

In the hypothetical transaction, assumethat the originator issuesits payment order on day 1 and the originator's
bank receives it on that day. Assuming that the originator does not specifically instruct the originator's bank to
execute on a future day, the bank will execute it on day 1. The execution is, therefore, on the sameday as the
day of receipt (day 1), and payment from the originator to the originator's bank is due on or before that day.

32/

U.C.C. Section 4A-403(a).

33/

U.C.C. Section 4A-401.

34/

Id.

L"

U.C.C. Section 4A-405(a).

36

Id.
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the U.N. Model Law) are modified by the rules of the central bank.37' However, there is
an important practicaldifference. A centralbank cannotgo bankrupt,thus there is no credit
riskassociatedwith sendinga paymentorderto, or receivinga paymentorder from, a central
bank. If the funds transferis not completed,then the reasonfor the non-completionwill lie
with a party other than the central bank.

37/

System.As
An exampleof suchrules would be RegulationJof the Boardof Govemorsof the FederalReserve
JelectsArticle4A asthegoverninglawand thedeviationsfrom thestatute
indicatedbelow,however,Regulation
are, on balance,minimal.
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IV. DISCUSSIONOF THE FIVE LEGALFOUNDATIONS
Scoperule
What is the scopeof application of the law? How doesa party seekingto send
funds electronically know whetherthe transmissionisa funds transfergovernedby applicable
funds transfer law? Who is included and who is excluded? Appropriate answersto these
questionsfostercertaintyand efficiency, in partby reducingthe likelihood of litigation about
the coverageof the law and thus reducingpotential legal costs.
Thesequestionsare answeredin U.C.C.Article 4A by referringto the definition
of "payment order." If an instruction is not a "payment order'" then Article 4A is not
applicable. The term "paymentorder" means:
an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally,
electronically,or in writing, to pay, or to causeanother bank to pay, a
fixed or determinableamount of moneyto a beneficiary,if:
(i)

the instructiondoes not statea condition to paymentto the beneficiary
other than time of payment,

(ii)

the receiving bank is to be reimbursedby debiting an account of, or
otherwise receiving paymentfrom, the sender,and

(iii)

the instruction is transmittedby the senderdirectly to the receivingbank or to
an agent, funds-transfersystem, or communication for transmittal to the
receiving bank.0'

There are five salientfeaturesof this definition. First,the instruction must be
issuedto a "bank." While any personcan be a "sender,"only a "bank" can be a "receiving
bank."39 A "bank" is "a personengagedin the businessof banking and includesa savings
bank, savingsand loan association,credit union, and trust company.'"' This definition is
LI'

U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1)(emphasissupplied). See U.N. Model Law Article 2(b).

39/

U.C.C.Section4A-103(a)(4)-(5)."Person"is usedthroughoutthe definitionsectionsof U.C.C.Article4A but not
definedtherein. Therefore,the U.C.C.Article 1 definitionwould apply. U.C.C.Section1-105(d). UnderArticle
1, a "'person'includesan individualor an organization."U.C.C.Section1-201(30).

40/

U.C.C. Section 4A-105(a)(2).
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flexible, applying to a variety of financial institutionsthat offer account services- regular
commercialbanksand certainother typesof financial institutionsthat takedepositsand make
loans. Thus, the scope of application is potentially wide.
Second,the amount of the instruction must be "fixed or determinable." In
most cases,the application of this requirement is straightforward. In the hypothetical, the
$100,000 amount is "fixed."
Third, the definition of "paymentorder" requiresthat the instruction contain
no condition other than time of payment.L" If the automobile manufacturer'sinstruction
to its bank said "pay $100,000 on day 10 if you receive delivery of shipping documents
pertainingto the purchasedsteel,"then the requirementwould not be satisfied. Only the
statementregardingday 10 is permissible;the statementregardingpresentationof documents
to the bank is a condition other than time of payment. If both statementsare included in the
instruction, then it is not a "paymentorder" and U.C.C.Article 4A is inapplicable.
The fourth requirementconcerns payment for the payment instruction. A
receiving bank that receivesa payment instruction from its sendermust be reimbursed by
2' This meansthat
debiting an account of, or otherwisereceiving paymentfrom, the sender.A
credit transfersare included, but all electronic funds transfersthat are debit transfersare
excluded.4' In the hypothetical, if the originator's bank is reimbursedfor the automobile
company'spayment order by debiting an account of the company,then this requirement is
met.
The way in which this result is obtained raises the important distinction
betweena credit and debit transfer. "In a credit transferthe instructionto pay is given by the
person making payment. In a debit transferthe instruction to pay is given by the person
receiving payment."4-` The classic example of a debit transfer involves a check or other
negotiable instrument.45'In a check transaction,a debtor (the drawer of the check) gives
authority to the creditor (the payeeof the check)to draw on the debtor's account which is

4"

U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1)(i).

42/

U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1)(ii).

43

U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1)(ii) official comment 4.

44/

Id. See also U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note, p. 11.

45/

Negotiableinstrumentsare governedby U.C.C.Articles3 and 4. U.C.C.Sections3-102and 4-102.
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maintainedat the payor bank (alsocalled the drawee).AL'The authority is given by drawing
the check and transferringthe check to the payee. In turn, the payeeissuesthe instruction
to pay to the payor bank when it depositsthe check.4" That is, the payee (not the drawer)
issuesthe instruction by depositingthe check in the depositary bank (at which the payee
maintains an account), and the check is presentedto the payor bank through the check
collection process."' Assumingthe payor bank honors the check, it is reimbursedby the
debtor, not the person giving the instruction (the payee).49' "Article 4A is limited to
transactionsin which the accountto be debited by the receivingbank is that of the person
in whose name the instruction is given.''"S In sum, in a funds transferthe payor (originator)
issuesthe instruction (paymentorder) to the paying bank (originator'sbank) and reimburses
that bank. In a check transactionthe payeeissuesthe instruction(the check) and the paying
bank (payor bank) is reimbursedby the drawer of the check.
Finally, to qualify as a payment order, an instruction must be transmitted
directly by the sender to the receiving bank (or its agent, funds transfer system, or
communication system for subsequenttransmission to the receiving bank).-` In the
hypothetical, each instruction is directly transmittedfrom sender to receiving bank. This
requirementservesto exclude from U.C.C. Article 4A paymentsmade by meansof a check
or credit card, for example.'
Assumethat the partiesknow that U.C.C.Article 4A applies to their transfer.
Does it apply to the entire transfer,from the originator to the beneficiary? This is the issue
of "end-to-end"coverage.Generally speaking,U.C.C.Article 4A is intendedto apply end-toend.S-3The rules of a funds transfersystem like Fedwire - namely, RegulationJ of the
Boardof Governorsof the FederalReserveSystem- ensuresuch coverage. For example, if
the funds transferis through Fedwire,then whether remoteparties(i.e., those that are not in

46/

U.C.C. Sections 3-102(l)(d) (the "drawer" is a secondary party on the check, whereas the payor bank becomes
primarily liable upon accepting the check); 3-302 ("payee" may be a holder in due course), and 4-105(b)
(definition of "payor bank").

471

U.C.C. Section 3-102(1)(a)(definition of "issue").

481

U.C.C. Section 4-105(a) (definition of "depositary bank").

49/

U.C.C.

Lo/

U.C.C.Section4A-104official comment4.

5"1

U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1)(iii).

52/

U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1)official comment 5.

53/

U.C.C. Prefatory Note, iii and Section 4A-507(c).

Section 4A-104 official comment 4.
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privity with a FederalReserveBank)are bound by RegulationJ dependson whetherthey had
prior notice that (1) Fedwiremight be usedand (2) the applicable law governingFedwire is
RegulationJ.5-4 Privity meansthat the partiessend payment orders directly to or receive
orders directly from a Reserve Bank.2' These requirements presumably avoid the
unwarranted extension of Regulation J or the extraterritorial application thereof in
1 RegulationJ, however, essentiallystatesthat U.C.C. Article 4A
inappropriatesituations.16
is the law governing Fedwire.2' Similarly, the rules of the CHIPSsystemmake clear that
Article 4A governsthat system.5&'
Trigger event
At what point are the rights and obligations of a party to a funds transfer
triggered? In other words, when doesthe party gain certain legal entitlements,and when is
it legally "on the hook" to perform certain duties? Appropriateanswersto these questions
can promote certainty. The answersalso can ensurethat funds transfersare conducted
efficiently, specifically, in a high speedmanner.
The answersare provided in U.C.C.Article 4A by the concept of acceptance.
"Rightsand obligationsunderArticle 4A ariseasthe resultof 'acceptance'of a paymentorder
by the bank to which the order is addressed."5' Only when a receiving bank acceptsa
paymentorder issuedby its senderare the rights and obligationsof the receiving bank and
sendertriggered.
As the hypotheticalsuggests,acceptanceis divided according to the class of
receiving bank. A receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank, in the example, the
originator's bank and the intermediarybank (the automobile manufacturer'sbank and the
second bank, respectively),can accept a payment order only by executing the order.
"Execution"meansthe issuanceof a paymentorder that conformswith the termsof the order

541

55

12 C.F.R. Section 210.25(b)(2)(v)(1992).
12 C.F.R.Section 210.25(b)(2)(ii)-(iii) (1992).

56/

See 12 C.F.R. subpt. B, app. A comment (a) to Section 210.25 (1992).

5"7

See ERNESTT. PATRIKIS,THOMASC. BAXTER,JR.,AND RAJBHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS
140 (1993).

58/

See id. at 191.

59'

U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note p. iv (emphasissupplied). Seealso Section 4A-209 (regarding acceptanceof
a payment order) and official comment 1 thereto ("[a]cceptanceof the payment order imposesan obligation on
the receiving bank to the sender if the receiving bank is not the beneficiary's bank, or to the beneficiary if the
receiving bank is the beneficiary's bank."). See U.N. Model Law Article 5(6).
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received from the sender..§'
In contrast,a beneficiary'sbank is responsiblefor crediting the account of the
b-neficiary (or otherwise lawfully applying funds received on behalf of the beneficiary).
There are essentiallythree acts that constitute "acceptance"by a beneficiary's bank: (1)
paymentby the beneficiary'sbank to the beneficiary;(2) notification from the beneficiary's
bank to the beneficiarythat a paymentorder has beenreceived;or (3) receiptof paymentby
the beneficiary's bank from the senderthat issuedthe payment order to the beneficiary's
bank.L" Acceptanceoccurs at the earliest of these times. The first two acts involve the
"downstream" relationship between the beneficiary's bank and its customer, the
beneficiary.62'The third act involves the "upstream"relationshipbetween the beneficiary's
bank and its sender.03'
What rightsand obligationsaretriggereduponacceptanceof a paymentorder?
Again, there is bifurcation. The basicduty of a senderwhose paymentorder is acceptedby
a receivingbank is to pay the receivingbank for the order. Conversely,the basicright of the
receiving bank is to be paid for the acceptedorder. While this right-duty set is triggered
upon acceptance,it does not mature until the execution date.64'In addition, the senderhas
a right to have its paymentorder, upon acceptance,executedat the right time, in the right
amount, and to the right place.L' This is a trinity of rights which, from the receiving bank's
perspective,constitutea trinity of duties.

60/

U.C.C. Sections 4A-209(a) and 4A-301(a).

6U

U.C.C. Section 4A-209(b). This list is incomplete because there is a fourth manner of acceptance. A
beneficiary's bank can do nothing with the payment order received and wait until the opening of the next fundstransfer business day. In other words, the beneficiary's bank can defer acceptanceovemight (and, therefore,
defer payment to the beneficiary). The incentive to do this is to "buy time" to see whether the sender will pay
for the order. (Delaying acceptanceis not possible if the beneficiary'sbank has been paid by its sender, because
that payment is by definition a form of acceptance.) U.C.C. Section 4A-209(b)(3)and official comment 5. See
also Section 4A-405 official comment 2. Of course,this method of acceptanceis unavailable if the funds transfer
is through a system like Fedwire, becausethe payment order and payment are received simultaneously.

62/

Payment by a beneficiary's bank to a beneficiary is govemed by U.C.C. Section 4A-405, which is discussed
below in the context of the receiver finality rule.

63/

Payment by a sender to a receiving bank is covered in U.C.C. Section 4A-403.

64/

U.C.C. Section 4A402(c). Note that if the receiving bank is the beneficiary's bank, then the obligation of the
sender to pay matures on the payment date, which is the date the order is payable by the beneficiary's bank to
the beneficiary. Thus, the beneficiary's bank is afforded the legal protection of being entitled to payment from
its sender no later than the time it must pay its customer, i.e., it need not have paid out before receiving interbank settlement. U.C.C. Section 4A-402(b).

65/

U.C.C. Section 4A-302(a).
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The right-duty set pertainingto the beneficiary'sbank and the beneficiary is
straightforward. Upon acceptanceof a payment order, the beneficiary's bank has an
obligation to pay the order, and the beneficiaryhas a right to be paid.A' These mature on
the payment date, which typically is the day the order is received by the beneficiary's
bankY`
Receiverfinality
When doesa beneficiaryknow that it has received"good funds"? If the steel
company receivesa $100,000 credit to its account, is the credit provisional (revocable),on
the one hand,or final on the other hand? If the credit is revocable,then the steel company
cannot irrevocablycommit the $100,000to other uses (
paying its bills, paying dividends,
investing in new projects, and the like). This is becausethe steel company's bank (the
beneficiary'sbank)might demandthat the $100,000be returnedif the bank does not finally
receivepaymentfrom the intermediarybank. An answerto this dilemma is crucial if a funds
transferis to be a certain, efficient (especiallyhigh speed),and fair mode of payment.
Once a beneficiary'sbank haspaid the beneficiary,it hastherebysatisfiedthe
obligation to pay the beneficiarythat arisesfrom its acceptanceof a paymentorder on behalf
of the beneficiary. The payment is final.2' The paymentfor the funds transfercannot be
recoveredby the beneficiary'sbank. This isthe receiverfinality rule. Eventhe beneficiary's
right to withdraw a credit (je, even if the beneficiary'saccount has been credited but the
beneficiary has not withdrawn the credit) cannot be revoked.
2' Consider
The receiverfinality rule is subject to one important exception.9
a major settlement failure ih a funds-transfersystem that nets payment obligations on a
multilateral (or net-net)basisand has a loss-sharingarrangementamong participantsin the
systemto handle a settlementfailure by one or more participants.7' If a beneficiary'sbank
acceptsa paymentorder but the multilateral netting systemfails to complete settlementin
spite of the operation of the loss-sharingscheme,then the acceptanceis nullified and the

66/

U.C.C. Section 4A-404(a).

67/

U.C.C. Section 4A401.

68/

U.C.C. Section 4A-405(c). The U.N. Model Law does not contain a receiver finality rule because it does not
purport to govern the relationship between the beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary. That relationship is
governed by local law.

69/

An additional exception, not treated here, pertains to funds transfersinvolving automated clearing houses. See

U.C.C.Section4A405(d).
70/

U.C.C. Section 4A-405(e). The classic example of such a system is CHIPS.
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beneficiary'sbank can recover funds from the beneficiary.7" In this unwind scenario,the
funds transferis not completed,the originator is not dischargedon its underlying obligation
to the beneficiary, and each sender is excusedfrom its obligation to pay for its payment
order. This exception to the receiverfinality rule supportsthe developmentof loss-sharing
agreementsand other methodsto achievefinality on privatelyoperatedfunds transfersystems
that rely on netting. The unwind exception is a "last resort escape" from potentially
expensivesettlementguaranteesthat remaining(andpresumablysolvent)participantsin the
fundstransfersystemmight be unableto meet. Only by accountingfor the potential trade-off
between settlementguaranteesand finality can the law promote nettingsystemsdesignedto
offer their usersfinality on a routine basis.
Becauseof this exception to the receiverfinality rule, some observers(e.g.,
officials at the Bundesbankand Bank for InternationalSettlements)contend that a real-time,
gross-settlement(RTGS)funds transfersystemis preferableto a netting system. In a RTGS
system,there is no worrisome overhangof a possiblesettlementunwind, yet this possibility
plaguesa multilateral netting system. Of course, netting servesthe purpose of lowering
systemicrisk by reducingthe numberand volume of funds transfers. Ultimately, the choice
betweenthe systemsmay dependon country, market,and technologicalconditions.
The receiverfinality rule is constrainedwhen the beneficiary's bank (having
accepteda payment order) hasa "reasonabledoubt concerningthe right of the beneficiary
to payment."!j' But, the beneficiary's bank risks incurring liability for consequential
damagesas a result of its nonpaymentif the beneficiarydemandspayment, the bank has
notice of "particular circumstancesthat will give rise to consequentialdamagesas a result of
nonpayment," and it is shown that the bank lacked reasonabledoubt.'3' This is the only
instancein U.C.C. Article 4A where consequentialdamagesare a remedy provided by the
7 4'
statute,absenta written agreementbetween partiesthat calls for consequentialdamages.
Interloper fraud rule
Modern day electronic pirates abound. A fraudsperson (also called an
interloper) claiming to be an official of the automobile manufacturercould send a payment
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Id.

72/

U.C.C. Section 4A404(a).

73/

Id.

74

damagesfor late or improperexecutionof a paymentorder, or
(consequential
U.C.C. Section4A-305(c)-(d)
failure to executea paymentorder,are not recoverableunlessagreedto expresslyin writing by the receiving
bank).
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order to the automobilemanufacturer'sbank instructingthat $100,000 be paid to an account
#10017 at the BCCIin the Grand CaymanIslands. How is the automobile manufacturer's
bank to determinewhether the paymentorder is really that of its customer,the automobile
manufacturer? If the bank executesthe order and debits the automobile manufacturer's
accountfor $100,000, is the bankobliged to re-creditthe account when it is discoveredthat
the paymentorder was not authentic? What if the paymentorder is issuedby an employee
or agent of the automobile manufacturerthat has accessto its bank account information?
Appropriate answersto these questions promote certainty, efficiency in the senseof high
security,and fairness.
U.C.C.Article 4A addresses
the interloperfraud problemthrough the concept
of a "securityprocedure"and rules basedon the existenceor non-existenceof such a security
procedure.
A security procedureis the genericterm for a device or method (whetheran
electronic messageauthenticationor other computeralgorithm,code words, telephonecallback, or the like) for "verifying that a payment order is that of the customer.....7 The
U.C.C. Article 4A rules are summarizedas follows:
In a large percentageof cases,the payment order of the originator of the
funds transferis transmittedelectronicallyto the originator's bank. In these
casesit may not be possiblefor the bank to know whether the electronic
messagehas been authorized by its customer. To ensure that no
unauthorized person is transmitting messagesto the bank, the normal
practice is to establishsecurity proceduresthat usually involve the use of
codes or identifying words. If the bank accepts a payment order that
purports to be that of its customer after verifying its authenticity by
complying with a security procedureagreed to by the customer and the
bank, the customeris bound to pay the order even if it was not authorized.
But there is an important limitation on this rule. The bank is entitled to
paymentin the caseof an unauthorizedorder only if the court finds that the
security procedure was a commercially reasonablemethod of providing
security againstunauthorizedpaymentorders. The customercan alsoavoid
liability if it can prove that the unauthorizedorder was not initiated by an
employee or other agent of the customer having accessto confidential
security information or by a personwho obtained that information from a
source controlled by the customer....Ifthe bank accepts an unauthorized
paymentorder without verifying it in compliancewith a security procedure,
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U.C.C.Section4A-201. SeeU.N. Model LawArticle 5(1).
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the loss falls on the bank.7'
Three analytical steps are apparent from the summary: the agreement; commercial
reasonability;and the "not an insider" defense.
First, has a security procedure been establishedpursuant to an agreement
betweenthe senderand receiving bank? If no procedureexists,then interloper fraud issues
are resolved under non-U.C.C.Article 4A principles, specifically,the law of agency,that is,
7 7'
the law that establisheswhen one personis consideredto be acting on behalf of another.
The resolutionthat might be achieved underthis law will turn on whetherthe fraudsperson
sent the payment order with the authority (whetheractual or apparent) of the purported
sender. Thus, if no security procedureexistsbetweenthe automobilemanufacturerand its
bank, then whether the paymentorder issuedby the fraudspersonwas authorized by the
automobile manufacturerwill be determinedunderapplicable agencylaw principles.
A securityprocedure,in theory, is not unilaterally imposedby one partyor the
other, but rather resultsfrom negotiationsculminating in a written account agreement. To
be sure, many customersare likely to havea standard-formcontractspecifying a particular
procedurepresentedto them by their banks. Assumingthat a security procedurehas been
agreed to between the bank and its customer,the next step is to consider whether that
procedureis "commercially reasonable."
"Commercial reasonability" is a question of law, not fact. The judge's
discretion is limited by U.C.C. Article 4A, which setsout criteria for evaluatingwhether a
security procedureis commercially reasonablein a caseat bar: "the wishesof the customer
expressedto the bank, the circumstancesof the customerknown to the bank, including the
size, type and frequencyof paymentorders normally issuedby the customerto the bank,
alternative security proceduresoffered to the customer,and security proceduresin general
use by customersand receivingbankssimilarly situated."`2'
To avoid liability, the originator'sbank in the hypotheticalmustprove that the
securityprocedureit agreedto with its customeris commerciallyreasonable.In addition, the
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U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note p. vii (emphasissupplied). The rules are set forth at Sections 4A-201

through4A-204.
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U.C.C.
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U.C.C.

Section 4A-202(a).

and this
Section4A-202(c). Note that a securityprocedurecan be deemedcommerciallyreasonable,
presentsbank counselwith a usefulnegotiatingtactic. SeeEmestT. Patrikis,ThomasC. Baxter,Jr.,and Raj
CODE
and the Roleof Counsel,23 UNIFORMCqMMERCIAL
Bhala,Article 4A: TheNew Law of FundsTransfers
219, 235-236 (1991).
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bank must show that it acceptedthe paymentorder in "good faith" and in compliancewith
the procedure.7' Acting in good faith and following the security procedureare issuesof
fact and, therefore, mattersfor a trier of fact such asa jury.
In the hypothetical funds transfer, suppose the originator argues that the
$100,000 issuedin its name and acceptedby the originator's bank was unauthorized,and
the ensuing $100,000 debit to its account should be reversed. Supposealso that the
automobile manufacturer'sbank provesto a judge that the security procedure in operation
between it and the automobile manufacturerby which the paymentorder was verified was
commercially reasonable.Supposefurther that the bank also provesto the trier of fact that
it acted in good faith in acceptingthe order and in compliancewith the procedure. Has the
purported originator, the innocent customerof the bank, lost the case?
Not necessarily,becauseof the "not an insider" defense. Thesuspectpayment
order may have been issued by a person who was not an employee or agent of the
automobile manufacturer,and who did not gain accessto the manufacturer'sbank account
information through someone controlled by the manufacturer. In other words, the
fraudspersonmay not have been an "insider" of the automobile manufactureror someone
close to an insider. If the "innocent" automobile manufacturerprovesthese facts,then the
automobilemanufacturer'sbankcannot retain paymentfor the paymentorder. Note that the
burden of proof has shifted: the automobile manufacturer'sbank has the burden on the
mattersof a security procedureagreement,commercial reasonability,and good faith and
compliance;but the customerpurporting to be a victim of fraud has the burden of the "not
U' Note also that the "not an insider" defenseis difficult to maintain
an insider" defense.
successfully. A large number of fraud, and even attemptedfraud, casesappear to involve
insiders.
There is no comparativenegligenceanalysisor sharingof liability in this legal
scheme. The purported sender/innocentcustomer(the automobile manufacturer)bearsthe
full $100,000 loss (in that its account is not re-credited)if (1) the bank provesthat it acted in
good faith and complied with a commercially reasonablesecurity procedure and (2) the
customercannot meet the innocent customerdefenserequirements.A"
'9

LO/
Hl

U.C.C.Section4A-202(b)."Goodfaith" is definedin Section4A-105(a)(6)as "honestyin factandthe observance
commercialstandardsof fair dealing."
of reasonable
U.C.C. Sections 4A-202 and 4A-203.

Theconceptof an "electronicsignature"is a potentialsecurityprocedure.However,the precisemeaningof this
conceptis unclear. On the one hand,it could involvea meansto identifythe originatorof a fundstransferin effect,a personalidentificationcode. On the otherhand,it could meannot only such a code, but also a
methodof telling where the originatoris located,the computershe usedto send a paymentorder,etc. - in
effect,a tracingdevice. Whateverthe meaning,the critical legalissueis commercialreasonability.
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Money-backguaranteeand discharge
In the hypotheticalfunds transfer,what rightsdoeseachsender(theoriginator,
originator's bank, and intermediary bank) have if the funds transferis not completed? (A
funds transfer is complete when the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order for the
benefit of the beneficiary of the originator's order.Y' For example, is the automobile
manufacturerentitled to a refund of $100,000, or must it commencelitigation againstsome
downstreampartyto recoverthe funds? What rights do the automobile manufacturer'sbank
and the secondbank have in the eventof non-completion?Doescompletion havean effect
on the underlying contractualobligation of the automobilemanufacturerto pay $100,000 to
the steel company? Appropriateanswersto thesequestionspromote certainty,efficiency in
the form of low litigation costs,and fairness.
A money-backguaranteerule ensuresthat the originatorof a fundstransfer,and
each subsequentsenderof a payment order in the funds transferchain, obtains its money
back in the event the transferis not completed. A funds transferis said to be completed
when the beneficiary'sbank acceptsa payment order on behalf of the beneficiaryPY If the
transferis not completed,then eachsenderof a paymentorder in the funds transferchain is
entitled to a refund of the principal amount of the payment order, plus any accrued
interest.-4 If the transfer is completed, then the originator's underlying contractual
obligation to the beneficiary is discharged.-'
In the hypotheticalfunds transfer,assoonas the steelcompany'sbankaccepts
the payment order issued by the second bank, the funds transfer is complete and the
automobile manufactureris dischargedon its underlying obligation to pay $100,000 to the
steelcompany. In the event of non-completion,eachsender- the automobilemanufacturer,
the automobile manufacturer'sbank, and the secondbank - is entitled to a refund of any
8 6'
amount it paid for its paymentorder, plus interest.
The money-backguaranteemay not be varied by an agreementbetween the

Section4A-104(a). SeeU.N. Model LawArticles14(1) and 19(1).

82/

U.C.C.

83'

U.C.C. Section 4A-104(a).

84/

U.C.C. Section 4A-402(c)-(d).

8'

U.C.C. Section 4A-406(b).

86~" The rate of interest is determined in accordancewith U.C.C. Section4A-506. Unless otherwise agreed, it is the
Federal funds rate.
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senderand receiving bank.L" However, the rule is subject to the exception that a sender
that selectsa particular intermediarybank throughwhich to route a funds transferbearsthe
risk of loss associatedwith the failure of that bank.k'
Supposethe automobilemanufacturerinstructedits bankto routethe $100,000
transferthrough BCCI insteadof the secondbank, and the automobile manufacturer'sbank
complieswith this instructionand debitsits customer'saccount. Assumethat BCCIis closed
by bankingsupervisors.The closureoccursafter BCCIacceptsthe paymentorder issuedby
the automobile manufacturer'sbank and is paid for the order by that bank, but before the
funds transferis completed (jL, beforethe steelcompany'sbank acceptsBCCI'sorder). The
effectiveresult of thesefacts is that the funds are "stuck" at BCCI. Then, the originator is not
entitled to a re-credit of $100,000. The automobile manufacturer'sbank can keep the
$100,000, and the automobile manufactureris subrogatedto the right of its bank to claim
againstthe receiveror trusteeof BCCI'sassets.(Thatis, the automobilemanufacturer'sability
to retrieve the $100,000 dependson the right of its bank to claim againstthe receiver.) In
sum, the party (here,the originator)who designatesthe failed intermediarybank should and
does bear the risk of adverseconsequencesof that choice.
A note on bank failure
The consequencesof bank failure on account holders depend in part on the
time the failure occurs and on which bank in the funds transferchain fails.
*

Failureof an intermediarybankbeforecompletion

In the above example, BCCI fails before the funds transfer is complete,
therefore,the risk of loss is assumedby the party that designatedthe useof the intermediary
bank.
*

Failureof an intermediarybankafter completion

If BCCIfails after the transferis complete, then the beneficiary'sbank must
have accepteda paymentorder from BCCI,and the originator must have been discharged,
before the failure. This is becauseof the definition of "completion" and the discharge
rule.Y' Paymentby the beneficiary'sbank to the beneficiaryis final becauseof the receiver

87/

U.C.C. Section 4A-402(f).

88/

U.C.C. Section 4A-402(d).

89/

U.C.C. Sections 4A-104(a) and 4A-406, respectively.
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finality rule.90JWhether the beneficiary'sbank was paid by BCCIfor the order it received
and acceptedfrom BCCIbefore the beneficiary'sbank paid the beneficiarydependson the
facts of the case. If the beneficiary'sbank acceptsBCCI'sorder by paying the beneficiary
before receiving settlementfrom BCCI,then the beneficiary'sbank assumesthe risk of loss
from a BCCIfailure.l'
*

Failure of the originator's bank before acceptance

The above discussionpromptsthe question of what happensif BCCI remains
solvent,but the originator's bankor the beneficiary'sbankfails. Considerfirst the casewhere
the originator's bank fails beforeacceptingthe originator'spaymentorder. Plainly, the funds
transferis not complete and the originator's obligation to pay $100,000 to the beneficiary is
not discharged. Under U.C.C. Article 4A, becausethe originator's bank failed before
acceptance,the duty of the originatorto pay the originator'sbank for its order never matured,
hencethe originator is not liable for the order it issued.92It is entitled to a refund of any
money it might have paid to the originator's bank for its paymentorder.
*

Failure of the originator's bank after acceptance

If the originator's bank fails after acceptingthe order, then the originator is
obligated to pay for its order."' Assuminga same-dayexecution scenario,the originator's
bank will have acceptedthe originator'spaymentorder by issuinga conforming order, i.e.,
by executing the originator's order, on the day it received the originator's order.94 Under
U.C.C. Article 4A, if BCCIacceptsthe order of the originator's bank, then the originator's
bank is liable to pay for its order.95 Whether this liability is affectedby applicable Federal
bank regulatory provisions is beyond the scope of this presentation,but the issue raises

90/

U.C.C Section 4A-405(c).

21"

Under U.C.C. Section 4A-209(b)(1) (clause (i)), one manner in which the beneficiary's bank can accept a
payment order is by paying the beneficiary in accordance with Section 4A-405(a) or (b). Section 4A405(a)
concerns a credit to the beneficiary's account, and Section 4A-405(b) concerns payment by means other than
a credit as determined by "principles of law that determine when an obligation is satisfied." The point is that
the beneficiary's bank can pay the beneficiary before the bank has received settlement from its sender.

92/

U.C.C.

93/

Id.

24/

U.C.C. Sections4A-209(a) and 4A-301.

95/

U.C.C. Article 4A-402(b).

Section 4A402(c).
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potentially intriguing legal and policy issues.!'
For example, the originator is not dischargeduntil the beneficiary's bank
acceptsan order from BCCI,but supposeBCCIis unwilling to accept the order issuedby the
originator's bank until the originator'sbank providessettlementfor its order. In this instance,
BCCIpresumablyis unwilling to assumethe risk that the originator's bank fails after BCCI
acceptsthe order but beforeBCCIhasbeen paid for the order. Theoriginator will then bear
that risk, becauseit may have paid the originator's bank for its paymentorder but not have
beendischargedon its underlying paymentobligation to the beneficiary. If the originator's
bank fails beforedischargeoccurs,then the originatoris liable to the beneficiaryfor $100,000
on the underlying contractand must claim againstthe originator's bank (or its receiver or
liquidator) underthe money-backguarantee(or perhapsother applicable law).97This might
be justified on the ground that the originator is the party that selected the use of the
originator's bank by maintaining an accountat, and issuinga paymentorder to, that bank.
S

Failure of the beneficiary's bank

Considerthe scenarioin which the beneficiary'sbank fails. If this occurs after
acceptance,then the originator is dischargedon its obligation."' The beneficiarybearsthe
risk of loss and must make a claim againstthe failed bank (or its receiver or liquidator).
Again, this might be justifiable becausethe beneficiary is the party that designatedto the
originator in its underlying contractwith the originator that paymentshould be madeat the
beneficiary's bank. If failure occurs before acceptance,then the funds transfer is not
complete. The originator (and each subsequentsender)are entitled to the money-back
guarantee.'-' Presumably,the originator will pay the beneficiary through a funds transfer
directedto a different beneficiary'sbank (or throughan alternativepaymentsmechanism).

961

This scenario is perhaps more likely given the prompt corrective action rules implemented pursuant to the
Federal Deposit InsuranceCorporation ImprovementAct of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, section 131 (1991). See
12 C.F.R. Parts208 and 263 (1993).
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U.C.C. Section 4A-406.
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U.C.C.Section4A-402(c).

- 28 -

V. DRAFTING PRINCIPLES
Interestgroups

Law,includingpaymentssystemlaw, is not handeddownfromGod. Rather,
law resultsfrom a long and complicatedinteractionof interestgroupsthat advancetheir
economic,political, and socialagendas.U.C.C.Article4A andthe U.N. Model Laware
examplesof this interaction.Accordingly,neitherArticle4A northe Model Lawappeared
in the law booksquickly. Thedraftersnegotiated
for years,workingandre-workingconcepts
and specificlegal language.It would be foolishto suggestthat the work of everydrafter
reflectedthe sameor even similar theoriesas thoseheld by everyotherdrafter. To the
contrary,differentdraftershaddifferenttheoriesandthey negotiated,
argued,andultimately
compromisedwith one another.
However,it is possibleto groupthe draftersof U.C.C.Article 4A into three
broadinterestgroups:systemusers,systemproviders,andsystemsupervisors.
Thedelegates
to the UnitedNationsCommissionon International
TradeLaw(UNCITRAL)
thatdraftedthe
U.N. Model Lawalsotendedto reflecttheseconstituencies.
The usersof large-value
credit
transfersystems- typically corporatecustomersand some (usuallysmaller)financial
institutions- had consumerinterestsin mind. Their aim was to ensurethat stringent
liabilitieswereimposedon systemproviders.Hence,theysoughtclearruleson misdirected
paymentorders,andto hold banksliablefor consequential
aswell asactualdamagesunder
certaincircumstances.
Often,the arguments
of userswerecastin termsof fairness.
Conversely,
systemproviders- generally,largebanksandownersof particular
systems- soughtto minimizetheir liabilities. Theystruggledto avoid the impositionof
consequential
damages,
and ensurethat stringentrulesgoverningauthenticityand security
procedureswere drafted. Typically,their argumentswere castin termsof efficiencyand
reliability.
Finally,systemsupervisors
- centralbanksandfinanceministries- soughtto
minimize systemicrisks. Accordingly,they stronglyadvocatedthe receiverfinality and
dischargerules. Theydid not consistentlysidewith usersor providers.Indeed,oftenthey
playedthe roleof mediatorbetweenusersand providers,while at the sametime keepinga
watchfuleyeon their own interests.Theywouldemploythe languageof fairness,efficiency,
or reliabilitydependingon the needsof the problemat hand.
Whendraftinga fundstransferlaw, it maybe usefulto think in termsof users,
providers,and supervisorsas three distinct interestgroupswhose concernsmust be
addressed.However,it is not necessarily
desirableto encouragethis tripartitedivision of
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interestgroups during the drafting process. The countriesof the former Soviet Union, and
the Baltic countries, must draft legal frameworksfor large-valuefunds transfer system in
different environmentsfrom the one in which U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law
were created. Thinking in terms of consumer, bank, and supervisory interestsmay not
necessarilyreflectthese different environments.
Instead,it may be particularly fruitful to consider what questions are most
pressing. For example, to what extent is the general commercial law framework well
articulated and well developed? In some instances,the answer is that only a skeletal
framework exists. Are bankruptcyrules in placeto handle bank and customerinsolvencies?
In some cases,only nascentrules exist, and in other instancesno such rules have been
implemented. To what extent is fraud presentin commercialtransactions?Sadly, in some
casesfraud is relatively commonplace.
The rule of law
The specialenvironmentin developingandtransitioneconomies- present,for
example,in the countriesof the formerSoviet Union, and the Balticcountries- suggestsfive
fundamentaldrafting principles. First,asa thresholdmatterthe importanceof the rule of law
mustbe establishedfirmly. The paymentssystemlaw should be manifestat the highestlevel
of the hierarchy of rules in a particular country. If in a country'slegal systema statute has
greaterforce and effectthan a regulation,and in turn a regulationhasgreaterforce and effect
than an administrativeorder, then the law governingfunds transfersshould take the form of
a statute.Thisform should affordgreaterprotectionagainstpolitical or bureaucraticmeddling
in the paymentssystem. Of course,in certain countries- for instance,Vietnam- passinga
statuteis a more cumbersomeprocessthan issuinga regulation. Nonetheless,the rule of law
is fundamentalto the certain, efficient, and fair operation of a funds transfersystem,thus
proceduralhurdles in passinglaws must be overcome.
Accountability
Second,institutionsinvolved in fundstransfersshould be held accountablefor
their own behavior. Such partiesshould not expect assistancefrom the governmentin the
event of mishapsor financial difficulties. The utmost importancemust be accordedrules of
law, not relationshipsamongpartiesor betweena party and the government. In general,a
funds transferlaw must be part of a larger legal environmentthat is founded on individual
financial accountability,not central planningand control. In this regard,the participationof
the central bank in the funds transfersystemshould not be overemphasized. There is no
necessaryreasonwhy it must own and operatea system. Indeed, private party action and
responsibilityought to be encouraged,not only in transitionand developing economies,but
also in developed marketeconomies.
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Integration with other bodies of law
Third, funds transferlaw cannot developin a vacuum. This law must be seen
as part of the broad commercial and bankruptcy framework and not developed in a
piecemealfashion. Accordingly, the rules governing large-valuecredit transfersmust be
consistentwith those establishedfor contracts, negotiable instruments, letters of credit,
securedtransactions,and insolvencies. Thus, for example, the concepts of "commercial
reasonability" or "good faith" must be used consistentlythroughout the framework. The
economic incentivescreatedby the differentpartsof the frameworkmust also be consistent.
Commercial law is a seamlessweb, and thus there must be a holistic integrity to the law.
Fraud prevention
Fourth, particular emphasismust be given to fraud prevention. Accordingly,
appropriatesafeguardsmust be implementedthat create incentivesfor all partiesto a largevaluecredit transferto exerciseat leastreasonablecare. More generally,the legalframework
must be seen as a primary guarantorof the integrity of the paymentssystem. Nothing
underminesthat integrity fasterthan fraud. However, in drafting rules on fraud prevention,
an inevitable tensionbetween securityand efficiency must be managed. On the one hand,
requiringreceivingbanksandtheir sendercustomersto exercisegreatdiligence in preventing
fraud raisesthe level of security. On the other hand, the greaterthe burden on receiving
banksand sendersto act as policemenagainstfraud,the higherthe monetarycost of a funds
transfer, and the longer it may take to processa transfer. There is no simple recipe for
managing this tension; rather, the appropriate solution will depend on the country in
question.
Supporting the financial markets
Fifth, the legal frameworkfor large-valuefunds transfersshould accommodate
the anticipatedgrowth and developmentof the economyand its constituentsectors. In the
U.S.and other post-industrialsocieties,the primary motivationfor engagingin such transfers
is not to settlepaymentsobligations arising from the sale of goods. In this sense,the case
study discussed above concerning the automobile manufacturerand steel company is
antiquated. In truth, the bulk of credit transferactivity is generatedby financial transactions- the buying and selling of foreign exchange,short-termmoney market instruments,and
various types of investmentsecurities. Accordingly, in developing a legal framework for
large-valuecredit transferssystems,the future needsof the financial community must be
anticipatedand addressed.-Lo'

"'

See Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KENTUCKYLAW JOURNAL347 (winter 1993-94).
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VI. SUMMARY
The legalfoundationsof the large-value
credittransfersystemsin the United
States,FedwireandCHIPS,are setforth in U.C.C.Article 4A. The samelegalfoundations
arefound in the U.N. Model Law. Amongthe manyprovisionsin theselegaltexts,at least
five are particularlynoteworthy: (1) a rule defining the scopeof the law; (2) a rule
establishing
when the rightsandobligationsof partiesto a fundstransferaretriggered;(3)a
receiverfinality rule; (4)a ruleassigningliabilityfor interloperfraud;and(5) a money-back
guaranteerule, coupledwith provisionson discharge.The rulesare articulatedthrough
preciseterminologyidentifyingeachpartyto a fundstransferandthe actionsthateachparty
undertakes.
Mustthe five rulesexistin anyfundstransferstatute?To whatextentcanone
generalizefromtheArticle4A or U.N.Model Lawexperience?
Thesequestionsdeservetwo
levelsof analysis.First,comparative
legalresearch
on the lawsgoverninglarge-value
credit
transfersystemsin otherjurisdictionsis neededto identifythe foundationsof thoselaws. In
otherwords,thoselawsneedto be distilled.Second,
theoreticaldebate,involvingeconomic
rationalesand public policy goals,is requiredto determinethe justificationsfor alternative
statutoryfoundations.
While theseanalyseshaveyet to be performed,one point of caution is
appropriate: commerciallaw, includingfundstransferlaw, is not immutable. It serves
commercialpartiesand their transactions,
but becauseboth of thesechangeover time,
individualneedsandsystemicconcernsvary aswell. Accordingly,the legalfoundationsof
a regimefor large-value
credittransfersystems,shouldbe viewedasdynamic,not static.
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